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o examine how the actions of Tibetan Buddhists shaped the 
emergence of modern China, Gray Tuttle presents a broad overview 
of two and a half centuries of Sino-Tibetan relationships. He intends 
to show the role played by Buddhists, both Chinese and Tibetans, in the 
construction of the new China based on the idea of the nation-state; the 
influence of these Buddhists on Sino-Tibetan relations; and how modern 
ideas such as nationalism, race, and religion have affected the relations 
between Chinese and Tibetans.   
In the first part of his book, Tuttle offers a useful synthetic analysis of the 
relationship between Manchus and Tibetans. Tuttle emphasizes cultural 
issues. He first describes the relationship between Manchus and Tibetans as 
inherited from traditional patronage and the previous imperial tradition that 
can be dated back to the eleventh century. For him, the early relationship 
was characterized by cordial cooperation, as neither tried to implement 
policies to change the culture of the other state. Tuttle points to three main 
Tibetan Buddhists sites that served as links between Tibet and the Manchu 
Qing court: Mount Wutai, from the beginning of the eighteenth century; the 
Yonghe gong, after the lCang-skya Qutughtu (Rol pa’i rdo rdje 1717-1786) 
founded it in 1744; and the Forbidden City’s Zhongzheng dian. Lhasa 
appointed Tibetan masters at these sites from the end of the seventeenth 
century until the 1930s. From the Manchu side, these relationships were 
handled by the Emperor first, then the Imperial Household (neiwufu) and the 
Court for Managing the Frontiers (Lifan yuan). Then, Tuttle suggests, the 
relations between the elites of the Qing Empire and the Tibetan Buddhist 
cultural world became political ones after the British invasion of Tibet in 
1904 (p. 34) and the growing involvement of Chinese, not Manchus, in 
Tibetan affairs. As such, Tibet was included “in the Western model of 
nation-state relations and Chinese officials used the British acknowledgment 
of Qing suzerainty to claim Qing sovereignty of Tibet.” From then on, the 
Chinese tried to impose cultural and political reforms on the Tibetans in 
order to secure their western border.  
According to Tuttle, the question of the integration of the Tibetan 
territory inside the Qing Empire derives also from this shift from cultural to 
political relations. The author clearly states that the Manchus did not intend 
to incorporate Tibet into their Empire, as the first Chinese representatives of 
the Manchu Court did. 
Tuttle claims that the Manchu interest in Tibetan Buddhism was linked to 
the concept of a “patronage tradition,” but it is also true that on the Qing 
side the relationship became more and more institutionalized (Emperor, 
Imperial Household, Court for Managing the Frontiers, and, I would add, 
T 
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the Grand Council). It would have been useful for the reader to know more 
about how the Tibetan affairs were shared between the Imperial Household, 
the Court for Managing the Frontiers, and the Grand Council. Granted, on 
the Tibetan side, relations with foreign countries were not institutionalized, 
as the Tibetans did not inaugurate new administrative organs in their 
government nor, more precisely, did they include Manchu affairs into a 
single political structure. For the Tibetans, it is obvious that the relationship 
was instituted from one person to another, as between the Dalai Lama and 
the Manchu Emperor. However, his emphasis on cultural relations leads 
Tuttle to neglect the Manchu side, which saw Tibetan affairs incorporated 
into specific administrative organs.   
According to Tuttle, the Tibetan response to this newly aggressive policy 
of the Qing Court (the signing of treaties between the British and the 
Chinese regarding Tibet and the progressive incorporation of the Khams 
territory inside the administrative structure of their Empire) came mainly 
from the 13th Dalai Lama (1875-1933) who, at that time, became a nationalist. 
The 13th Dalai Lama, thanks to the meeting he held with politicians from 
different countries during his two exiles (in China after the raid of the British 
in 1904 and in British India after the Chinese invasion of Lhasa in 1909), was 
trained in modern world politics. And then, in Tuttle’s account, with the fall 
of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, Tibetans succeeded in becoming de facto 
independent and tried, without success, to be a nation. These efforts toward 
independence led to economic and administrative reforms in Tibet that 
contributed to the decision of a number of lamas to leave Tibet—men who 
would become important actors in Sino-Tibetan relations during the first 
half of the twentieth century. 
Referring to the theory of James Millward, Tuttle suggests that during the 
Qing dynasty multi-ethnic unity was not achieved and the Qing maintained 
the cultural divisions of China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and the 
Muslims till the end of the dynasty. For Tuttle, the ethnic debates at court 
became important in the early twentieth century after the return of Chinese 
and Manchu intellectuals from Japan who wanted to be part of the emergent 
new Chinese Empire. The Chinese were in favor of the elimination of the 
Manchus, while the Manchus and some Chinese supporters proposed the 
creation of a multi-ethnic state. Finally, the policy of unity of the five peoples 
and of racial equality was implemented with the creation of the Republic of 
China in 1912. But from the perspective of the Inner Asian countries and 
their effort to separate from the new China, Tuttle argues that it was not 
simply assumed that the Republic of China should reclaim all of the Qing 
territory though Chinese leaders used the idea of unity of the five peoples 
precisely to legitimate their claims to Qing imperial territories. 
In the context of the multi-ethnic nation, what place was to be given to 
Tibetan Buddhists? According to Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists did not intervene 
one way or another in the emergence of the theory of the unity of the five 
peoples, but some of them were courted. For Tuttle, Buddhists, whether 
Chinese or Tibetans, redefined the religious community in order to “exercise 
power over politicians, nationalists, and colonialists”. This new community, 
born after the Parliament of World Religions held in Chicago in 1893, 
became real after Chinese Buddhists found support from the Tibetan monks, 
the lCang skya Qutughtu (1890-1957) at the beginning of the Republic and 
then the 9th Panchen Lama (1883-1937), to preserve their holdings. Tibetan 
Fabienne Jagou — Compte-rendu 
 
85 
monks and monasteries which were totally dependent from the imperial 
support during the Qing dynasty had also to find a way to survive in the 
new Republic of China. And at the same time, the laity found in Tibetan 
Buddhism a way to help their country.  
According to Tuttle, the main actors for the propagation of Tibetan 
Buddhism in Modern China were Bai Puren (1870-1927), rDo rje gcod pa 
(1874-?), the 9th Panchen Lama (1883-1937), Nor lha Qutughtu (1865-1936), 
and Chinese Buddhists monks—mainly Dayong (1893-1929), Fazun (1902-
1980), and Nenghai (1886-1967)—who went to Tibet to be trained into 
Tibetan Buddhist teachings before returning to China to transmit these 
teachings. Tuttle organizes their actions into historical periods:  
 
- 1925-1927, Tibetan masters in China dedicated their time to teach 
Buddhism and were not involved in politics. However, leaders of 
the Beijing government looked for the spiritual help of Tibetan 
masters. Duan Qirui (1865-1936) sponsored a ritual led by Bai 
Puren in 1925, was impressed by those given by Nor lha 
Qutughtu, recognized officially the Panchen Lama. 
- 1929-1931, Tibetan Masters and Chinese Buddhist monks were 
helped by Sichuan warlords who, in their turn, became involved 
in the process to link China and Tibet through religion. On the 
other hand, racial and nationalist ideologies failed, as Tibetan 
members of the Nationalist government tried to create separate 
counties in the Tibetan Khams area.  
- 1931-1935, Tibetan masters became members of the Nationalist 
government and Tibetan Buddhism was included in a new 
definition of the Buddhist religion; the Nationalist ideologue Dai 
Jitao (1890-1949) advocated the use of religion for political ends. 
- 1935-1950, the idea to join the Chinese and Tibetan cultures 
emerged and became reality through the foundation of 
institutionalized educational and religious exchanges. New 
institutions had to find teachers first and then funding. The 
warlords first participated in the creation of such institutes and 
then the Nationalist government became their main financial 
backer. These institutes gained students who, through 
translations, made the link between the Chinese and Tibetan 
cultures more vivid. 
 
Tuttle’s narrative of the first contacts between the Beijing government 
president and Buddhists shows that from both side the aim of the Buddhist 
activities was to renew with the Qing imperial tradition: the only physical 
link between the imperial tradition and the Nationalist China was Bai Puren, 
who apparently came from a lineage that was sponsored by the Qing 
Emperor ; Nor lha Qutughtu followed the Imperial tradition (but nothing is 
said about his intention to do so); and the Panchen Lama received a title 
from Duan Qirui (1865-1936), then president of the Beijing government. All 
three men received financial support from the Beijing government through 
Duan Qirui. Duan had personal connections with Bai Puren and Nor lha 
Qutughtu, but not with the Panchen Lama. As such, the Panchen Lama was 
granted a special status from the beginning. The Chinese monks who went 
to Tibet had different motivations (mainly Nenghai and Fazun who returned 
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to China to teach Tibetan Buddhism there and left writings). Nenghai 
wished to study esoteric Buddhism while Fazun wanted to bring back to 
China what he considered to be authentic Buddhism.   
The second part of this book deals with the relationships between Tibetan 
and Chinese Buddhist monks and the warlords. However, the transition 
between the two periods (1925-1927 and 1929-1931) is not obvious for the 
reader. We have seen that the Tibetan monks received support from the 
Beijing government and the Panchen Lama received special treatment, but 
the author considers that the Sichuan warlords were “more concerned” with 
Tibet and more interested in Buddhism than the leaders of the Beijing 
government. Tuttle also suggests that because Sichuan is close to Tibet the 
ex-warlords were “more responsive to the religious developments occurring 
around them”. But mainly, he credits the Sichuan warlords with a national 
vision for China by “imagining a role of religion in state matters” while the 
state, incarnated in the Nanjing government, still wanted religion and 
politics to be separated. In this very interesting section, Tuttle explains how 
the Sichuan laity supported the Tibetan monks from Khams such as rDo rje 
gcod pa and Nor lha Qutughtu and how Chinese monks such as Dayong 
and Nenghai originated from the province. Indeed, once in Sichuan, and in 
Kangding in particular, the Chinese monks who wanted to go to Tibet had 
to overcome financial, linguistic, cultural and political (on the part of the 
Tibetan government) barriers. First, Dayong was their main sponsor. When 
he died in 1929, the Chinese Buddhist monks became dependent on Tibetan 
monks from dKar mdzes and Li thang and succeeded in getting access to the 
prestigious Tibetan monastery of ‘Bras spungs. They benefited too from the 
teaching given by rDo rje gcod pa in Sichuan, who redistributed his benefits 
to them.  
As a matter of fact, Sichuan was the domain of various warlords, a 
situation that continued through the end of the 1930s, and, facing the rise of 
the Nationalists, it seems more likely that they were less concerned to 
“support a cause popular with the local people” and more concerned to 
support their own people, their own army and their own territory. Sichuan 
lay Buddhists, after many refusals, succeeded in inviting rDo rje gcod pa, 
whose teaching would become the most important in Sichuan given by a 
Tibetan monk in 1930. His message of peace transcended Sichuan’s borders 
and even China’s borders as he dedicated it to the saving of the world. And 
it was only after this event that the Sichuan province warlords began to 
support Tibetan Buddhism. 
It was Liu Xiang, a Sichuan warlord who, thanks to funding from 
Buddhist associations, sent Chinese monks to Tibet to study Tibetan 
Buddhism and founded the new Sino-Tibetan Buddhist Institute. As such, 
according to Tuttle, and contrary to government officials, he heard and 
realized the message of Taixu who promoted the idea that Japanese, Tibetan, 
and Chinese Buddhists unity would lead to “a mutually supportive 
relationship” with the state. Tuttle shows brilliantly how the Sichuan 
warlords acted despite the inaction of the central Chinese government and 
were precursors in establishing political support for the religious activities 
of the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists.  
The Nanjing government, on the contrary, continued to base its 
relationship with Tibetans on political grounds and incorporated the Tibetan 
masters into the structure of the government through the creation of a 
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political office for the Panchen Lama and the nomination of Nor lha 
Qutughtu as a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. 
On his side, the Dalai Lama used his existing representatives to Mount 
Wutai and the Yonghegong temple, opening official offices at those sites but 
the reader doesn’t know if they were recognized as such by the Nanjing 
government. At the same time, Dai Jitao and others attempted to open 
schools dedicated to the education of borderlands people with the official 
ideology of Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles. 
According to Tuttle, the main obstacle facing the Tibetan Buddhist lamas 
was linguistic. He considers that the Panchen Lama did not know Chinese 
(pp. 140, 142, 179) and had to rely on the Tibetan language. Tuttle took the 
example of the corpus of the Panchen Lama’s published Chinese writings, or 
so-called Panchen Lama Chinese writings,1 to demonstrate that the Panchen 
Lama or his representatives used the racial rhetoric (wuzu, wuzu gonghe) very 
occasionally and only when that was beneficial for them to do between 1925 
and 1933 (141-142). The author considers that from 1933 on, the Panchen 
Lama (or his translators) began to use the Chinese racial rhetoric (pp. 179-
180). He first considered these sources biased because they were published 
under Communist rule (p. 142) and mainly because he noticed the use of 
words that seem anachronistic (terms such as “Xizang minzhong” and 
“Xizang minzu” for example) (pp. 179-180). Tuttle, then, searched for 
occurrences, that would confirm the opinion expressed in the Chinese 
published sources he read, in the Panchen Lama’s Tibetan language works.2 
Analyzing them, he finds no evidence that the Panchen Lama adhered to the 
racial rhetoric. As such, for Tuttle, the new racial and ethnic divisions were 
rarely incorporated into the Panchen Lama’s works (p. 144). Tuttle, then, 
analyzes the terms used in the Panchen Lama biography to designate the so-
called ethnic groups and concludes that the Muslims were never included 
among “other races” because they are not associated with Buddhism, 
contrary to Chinese practice (pp. 143-144). Instead, the use of “being” (skye 
bo) is adopted to show an ethnic category. He questions the use of “mi rigs” 
that appears to be used as “an indicator of a type of person” in the Panchen 
Lama’s biography (pp. 144-145) and “would only be define under the 
Western standard during the Communist period” (p. 146).  
In sum, Tuttle insists that we do not know who wrote the discourses 
(only one was published in Tibetan) and the entire correspondence of the 
Panchen Lama in Chinese. The reader will agree that the question is very 
important regarding what we must attribute to the Panchen Lama and what 
the influence of the prelate’s entourage was.   
                                                       
1 Zhongguo di er lishi dang’anguan, comp. 中國第二歷史檔案館, Jiu shi Banchan neidi 
huodong ji fan Zang shouzu dang’an xuanbian 九世班禪內地活動及返藏受阻檔案選編 
(Selections from the archives concerning the ninth Panchen’s activities in China and the 
restrictions on his return to Tibet), (Nanking: Zhongguo Zangxue, 1992). 
2  Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘Jam dbyangs Ye shes bsTan pa’i rgyal mtshan, 
sKyabs mgon thams cad mkhyen pa Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma dge legs rnam 
rgyal bzang po’i zhal snga nas kyi thun mong pa’I rnam bar thar pa rin chen dbang gi 
rgyal po’i ‘phreng ba (Biography of the Panchen Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma), 
Reproduced from the bKra shis lhun po blocks, 1944; lHa mkhar yongs ‘dzin 
bstan pa rgyal mtshan, Pan chen thams cad mkhyen pa rje btsun Blo bzang thub bstan 
chos kyi nyi ma dge legs rnam rgyal bzang po’i gsung ‘bum (The Collected works of the 
Panchen Lama Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma), reproduced from bKra shis lhun po 
blocks, 1973 [1944]. 
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However, the limitations of Tuttle’s arguments need to be noted. 
Regarding the sources, Tuttle uses the Chinese archives published in 1993 
and as such considers them biased with reason. He did not have access to 
any original Chinese sources related to the Panchen Lama and convincingly 
suggests that if the discourses of the Panchen Lama have not been published 
by the actual Chinese government, they must contain words and ideas that 
not suit the present Chinese authorities (p. 163). From a practical point of 
view, Tuttle argues that the Panchen Lama was a non-Chinese speaker and 
could not have written his correspondence or his discourses by himself. 
However, contemporary testimony (to be taken with caution) says that the 
Panchen Lama spoke Chinese very badly and understood it.3 Indeed, we still 
have no evidence that he could write or read Chinese and as such, even if he 
pronounced his discourses in Tibetan and understood the immediate 
translation, he was not able to examine later translations and “often was 
deliberately misinformed.”4 Tuttle questions very carefully the Chinese 
sources and measures them against the Tibetan biography and collected 
writings of the Panchen Lama. However, the reader will search in vain for a 
historical analysis of these Tibetan sources. Tuttle’s faith in their veracity 
may also be challenged and, like the Chinese sources, should in fact be used 
with caution. The author should have studied the Tibetan biography and 
collected writings of the Panchen Lama with the same critical eye as he read 
the Chinese published sources. This study would have benefited from a 
discussion of the nature of the biography and collected works, their 
historical context, their authors, and the dates of their publication.  
In a nutshell, the biography and collected works were written for 
disciples who wanted to follow an example of spiritual realization and to 
learn how to attain Enlightenment. In that kind of writing, little room is left 
for political correspondence. As a corollary example, any of the 
correspondence exchanged between the 13th Dalaï Lama and the 9th Panchen 
Lama has been compiled into the 13th Dalaï Lama’s biography, which does 
not prove that any problems occurred and that any letters have been 
exchanged between them.  
The historical context of this biography is also very important. The 
biography is dated 1944. It ended in the Panchen Lama’s bKra shis lhun po 
Monastery three years after the return of the corpse of the Panchen Lama to 
Tibet and the year his stupa was completed. As a matter of fact, it was quite 
rapidly after the death of the Panchen Lama in 1937 while the dispute with 
the Lhasa’s government was not yet settled. Tuttle does not link the 
circumstances of the Panchen Lama departure from Tibet -- Tuttle considers 
that the Panchen Lama left Tibet because he “felt himself the victim of the 
Dalai Lama’s efforts to build a centralized Tibetan nation-state” (p. 9) and 
“the imprisonment of these officials [of the Panchen Lama’s monastic 
government] was the direct cause of the Panchen Lama’s flight from Tibet” 
(p. 55) -- the difficulties he encountered in returning to his monastery and 
the dispute between Lhasa and gZhis ka rtse was not settled in the 1940s. 
These circumstances could have prevented the author of the biography to 
include anything related to the Panchen Lama’s political actions in China 
                                                       
3  Gordon Enders, Foreign Devil: An American Kim in Modern Asia (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1942), p. 261 (available at: www.archive.org/details/ 
foreigndevilanam011500mbp). I am grateful to Isrun Engelhart for this reference. 
4 Ibid., p. 278. 
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that would demonstrate his adherence to Chinese government policies and 
threaten the life of people from bKra shis lhun po Monastery.  
From another point of view, we do not know which sources this 
biography was based on. Did the Panchen Lama’s entourage bring 
documents to Tibet? What kind of documents? We know that the Chinese 
archives, for which his Nanjing office was responsible, had been distributed 
between his two hagiographers (Chen Wenjian and Liu Jiaju, alias sKal 
bzang Chos ‘byor). We know too that Liu Jiaju published the Nanjing 
documents in his biography of the Panchen Lama.5 But, we still do not know 
the conditions of the compilation of the Panchen Lama’s Tibetan biography. 
Tuttle affirms the Panchen Lama is the author of his own biography and 
hesitates between calling it a “biography” (for example, p. 144) or an 
“autobiography” (for example, p. 186). However, the author of the Panchen 
Lama’s biography was not the Panchen Lama himself. It was Shakya dge 
slong Blo bzang ‘jam dbyangs ye shes bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan.6 For the 
reader, that modifies the conclusions of Tuttle concerning the use of 
Nationalist Chinese rhetoric and the acceptance of Chinese policies by the 
Panchen Lama. Did the Tibetans in Central Tibet hear about Sun Yat-sen’s 
ideology? Tuttle is very clear on that point: the answer is negative (p. 226). 
Did they hear about the merging of Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism? The 
answer is again negative. This is why the reader cannot find any reference to 
Chinese political ideology and why the author of the Tibetan biography 
used transliterations of Chinese terms to designate Chinese Buddhism (for 
example, pp. 70-71). I would add that most Chinese terms were translated 
phonetically at that time. But in any case, Tuttle seems mistaken when he 
writes, “the stark absence of an adoption of Chinese conceptions of racial 
terminology [into the Tibetan biography of the Panchen Lama] indicates the 
weak influence that Chinese conceptions of race and ethnicity had on 
Tibetans at this time” (p. 145) which in fact the biography was written by a 
disciple of the Panchen Lama living in Tibet who probably knew nothing 
about nationalist ideology.  
The date of the publication of the Panchen Lama’s biography is without a 
doubt the year 1944.7 However, this biography, after years of disappearance 
(some people considered it destroyed, others supposed it to be kept 
somewhere) perhaps reappeared around 19968 though most probably not 
before 2003.9 Two volumes became available at that time. One was written 
by a member of the research team of the bKra shis lhun po Monastery and is 
dated 1996, and the other was written by Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘Jam 
                                                       
5  Liu Jiaju, 劉家駒, Banchan da shi quanji 班禪大師全集 (The Collected Works of the 
Great Master Panchen), Chongqing, 1943. 
6  Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘Jam dbyangs Ye shes bsTan pa’i rgyal mtshan, 
op.cit., f.834, line 1. I hesitate however to follow this idea, as the title of the 
biography (which seems to have been added later) bears the inscription zhal snga 
nas (in front of) after the full transcription of the Panchen Lama’s name. But, it 
seems that this usage is a strictly honorific expression as the disciple can not 
write the name without this mark of deference. 
7  Ibid., f.833. 
8  At that time, a second biography was written under the supervision of the bKra 
shis lhunpo Monastery historical research group subsidized by the Chinese State 
Council, vol. stod cha, f.601-604. 
9  These volumes were scanned by the TBRC in 2003. 
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dbyangs Ye shes bsTan pa’i rgyal mtshan in 1944. The first question to ask is 
why two biographies became available suddenly? Why was a second one 
compiled? What are the differences between the two of them? What was the 
context of this sudden reappearance of the 9th Panchen Lama’s biography? In 
fact, these two biographies appeared during the dispute over the recognition 
of the 11th Panchen Lama. Could these biographies, a contemporary one and 
one new, be useful for China to claim a right to designate the 11th Panchen 
Lama? 
It is also worth noting that the compiler --presumably the ‘author’ was 
the Panchen Lama, since they are his collected works, even if he had writers 
working for him-- of the collected works of the 9th Panchen Lama was not 
the Panchen Lama himself, as claimed by Tuttle (p. 311). It was lHa mkhar 
yongs ‘dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan. Tuttle states clearly that the collected 
works of the 9th Panchen Lama were compiled in 1944 but released in 1973 
(p. 311). Apparently, the collected works were edited right in the middle of 
the Cultural Revolution when all Tibetan publications were stopped! That is 
an interesting point that Tuttle did not comment on. Instead, Tuttle simply 
considers that as there is almost no presence of the Nationalist ideology in 
these volumes, then the Panchen Lama was not influenced by it (p. 145). 
Once again, what would we expect of religious writings published at a time 
when the Communists were in the midst of a thorough attack on everything 
traditional, everything religious (!) and everything coming from the 
Nationalists? 
To conclude, Tuttle should have questioned both the Chinese and Tibetan 
published materials. Both types of sources offer insights but also barriers as 
to what the Panchen Lama and his representatives thought. The stories of 
both sides need to be analyzed with caution.  
From a philological point of view, as noted above, Tuttle remarks that 
racial rhetoric was rarely used by the Panchen Lama before 1933 while a 
1933 Chinese version of the Panchen Lama’s discourse used the terminology 
of ethnic classification: from “Xizang minzhong” to “Xizang minzu” (pp. 
179-180).10 However, although “Xizang minzu” is a new term introduced at 
the end of the discourse, Tuttle fails to note that “Xizang minzhong” and 
“Xizang renmin” are still used together in the same paragraph to mean the 
same thing. Following Tuttle’s idea, I will add that the same transformation 
occurred between the terms “zhongyuan,” used at the beginning of the 
translation, and “zhongyang,” used at the end. These two last words could 
be translated as “central plain” and “central government” or “center [i.e., 
China]” (as Tuttle suggests, p. 179), respectively. In the same way, the term 
“neidi” appears and “zhongyuan” disappears from then on. The point is 
that, in my opinion, this discourse is divided into two parts. The first 
recounts the history of Tibet and its relations with China before 1911, while 
the second is dedicated to the description of the situation in Tibet and in 
Mongolia in the 1930s and refers to the policies of the Chinese government—
and, therefore, uses Chinese republican government’s own vocabulary. This 
                                                       
10  Discourse entitled “Tibetan History and the Five Races United” (Xizang lishi yu 
wuzu lianhe), reproduced in Zhongguo di er lishi dang’an guan, comp., Jiu shi 
Banchan neidi huodong ji fan Zang shouzu dang’an xuanbian (Selections from the 
archives concerning the Ninth Panchen’s activities in China and the restrictions on his 
return to Tibet). Nanking : Zhongguo Zang xue, 1992, p. 56; Liu Jiaju, op. cit., pp. 
126-128. 
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is obvious too if we compare the original translation of the discourse in 
question with the translation reproduced in the volume quoted and used by 
Tuttle. The first part of the text encountered changes. Its modern 
Communist adaptations concern mainly the erasing of any idea related to 
the political status of Tibet before the founding of the Chinese republic and 
are very few. Thus “Qi hou Xizang wu tongyi zhi guowang” became “Qi 
hou Xizang wu tongyi zhi wang” (“guo,” which designates a country, has 
been erased). Later in the text, “Sajia zhi zhengquan” (the Sa skya political 
power) was erased, and “Xizang zhi fojiao” (Tibetan Buddhism) became 
“fojiao” (Buddhism). Into the second part, which begins with the sentence 
“After the founding of the Republic” (Minguo chengli yihou), the numerous 
changes introduced by the compilers relate mainly to the question of the 
borders of Chinese territory (and on the contrary the “Kang Zang renmin” 
used by the Panchen Lama’s translator has been changed to “Kang Zang 
minzhong”); “dong lai neidi” (came from the East to Inner China) has been 
replaced by “ru zhi neidi” (enter Inner China); “ru Nei Meng” (Enter Inner 
Mongolia) by “fu Meng zhi shi” (reach Mongolia); “Kang Qing liang qu” (both 
the Xikang and Qinghai region) by “Kang Qing liang sheng” (both Xikang and 
Qinghai provinces), and so forth. 
Actually, Tuttle did not get access to the original discourses of the 
Panchen Lama and depended mainly on the archival documents published 
by the Nanjing Second Historical Archives in 1993 for the Chinese point of 
view on that subject. Regarding the Panchen Lama’s correspondence, his 
translator used the expression “wuzu tongbao” (the compatriots of the five 
ethnic groups) in a letter dated 16 July 1926. With the original versions of the 
discourses of the Panchen Lama, we learn that the Panchen Lama began to 
use racial rhetoric from May 1931. In the discourse “Before governing the 
country, one as to govern itself”, the Panchen Lama’s translators used such 
terms as “ruoxiao minzu” (the weak ethnic group), “Meng Zang liang zu” (the 
two ethnic groups Mongol and Tibetans) ; in his 5 May 1931 discourse entitled 
“Xiwang Guoren renshi Xizang” (Tibetans citizens know Tibet): “ge minzu” 
(every ethnic group), “ruhe shi Meng Zang yu Zhongguo tuanjie cheng 
zhengge de minzu” (how to make the Mongols and Tibetans unite with the 
Chinese to become a real nation); in his 5 September 1931 discourse: “ge zu 
tuanjie” (the union of every ethnic group), “bing qing zhongyang genju sanmin 
zhuyi, fuzu ruoxiao minzu” (ask the Central Chinese government to help weak 
ethnic groups on the basis of the Three Principles of the People); and “Gai 
Zhonghua Minguo wei wuzu zhi fenzi shaozao er cheng” (Modify the 
Republic of China in order to eliminate separatism and stand up), and in his 
December 1932 discourse entitled “Zhongguo renmin aihao heping” (The 
people of China love peace). I would conclude that the Panchen Lama 
consistently used the Chinese government rhetoric but that became obvious 
as soon as the Nationalist government was settled in Nanjing (1928) and the 
territory of Inner China was unified (at least in 1930). The most important 
date is certainly 1931, when the Panchen Lama became a member of the 
Nationalist government and not, as Tuttle proposes, 1933, when he looked 
for the support of the Chinese government to go back to Tibet. Anyway, the 
question remains in its entirety as we don’t know who wrote the Panchen 
Lama’s discourses and who translated them. 
For Tuttle, then, the Panchen Lama did not support the harmonious 
coexistence of races but to the Sun Yat-sen policy “in the modern context of 
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both nationalism and the autonomy that Sun had promised to each nation 
within the former Qing Empire”. And, “while the Chinese government was 
embracing the Buddhist religion within its administration and in the halls of 
governance, the lamas made greater effort to integrate Chinese rhetoric in 
their public teachings and lectures.” The Panchen Lama accepted the secular 
and religious role the Nationalist government intended him to hold. He 
gave a Kalacakra initiation in Hangzhou to save the country in January 1933. 
For Tuttle, in the context of religion, the Panchen Lama followed both Sun’s 
ideology and the unity of the five races. From 1934 to 1937, the Panchen 
Lama spread the Chinese nationalist ideology in Amdo. The Nor lha 
Qutughtu received the same treatment and became a religious and political 
support for the Nationalist government.  
This could not have been achieved without Dai Jitao. Tuttle highlights his 
role in introducing Buddhism into the Nationalist government policy, his 
efforts to include the Panchen Lama in this policy, and the actions taken by 
Taixu. As such, the Nationalist government endorsed its role of protector of 
the master and renewed the patron-priest relationship, giving the Panchen 
Lama political positions and granting him title, while the prelate accepted 
the duty to preach Buddhism to unite the country, promote the well-being of 
the people, and advance world peace. According to Tuttle, Dai Jitao went 
further by explicitly supporting a return to the Tibetan Buddhist religio-
political system.  
The link that Tuttle established between ‘Ba bas (sKal bzang tshe ring 
(1899-1941) and sKal bzang chos ‘byor (Ch. Liu Jiaju, 1900-1977)) and the 
Panchen Lama is very interesting regarding the involvement or at least the 
awareness of the Panchen Lama of their attempt to bring autonomy to ‘Ba’ 
thang for sKal bzang tshe ring and to “Xikang counties” for sKal bzang chos 
‘byor. But the reader would wonder did the Panchen Lama never go to the 
Chinese province of Sichuan nor to the Tibetan province of Khams (except to 
die at its very north border at sKye rgu mdo) while he had two collaborators 
coming from these areas? These two ‘Ba’bas have educated backgrounds. 
sKal bzang tshe ring was very interested in politics and became the first 
Tibetan to join the Guomindang. He conducted a political career all his life. 
sKal bzang chos ‘byor was different. He was not so interested in politics and 
held many posts as a teacher or editor. Both became members of the 
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, and sKal bzang tshe ring 
became the head of the Tibetan affairs office. Their links to the Panchen 
Lama were also different. sKal bzang tshe ring served as his interpreter at 
the arrival of the prelate in Nanjing, then passing the job on to sKal bzang 
chos ‘byor, who kept this responsibility and followed the Panchen Lama 
almost permanently (he was one of the hagiographists of the Panchen Lama 
under the name of Liu Jiaju) and became, at the request of the Panchen 
Lama, his secretary and member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs 
Commission.  
The question is: did these two Khampas work for the independence (or, 
most probably the autonomy) of their counties or did they work on behalf of 
the Nationalist government to abolish Liu Wenhui’s control over the region? 
In Tuttle’s view, they applied the Chinese Nationalist government ideology 
they learned in China to their own locality wishing to attain the autonomy 
presented by Sun Yat-sen. For Peng Wenbin, not quoted by Tuttle, and who 
gave a masterful analysis of these attempts, the Chinese Nationalist 
Fabienne Jagou — Compte-rendu 
 
93 
government appropriated these Tibetan autonomy movements to “contain 
Liu Wenhui’s provincial warlordism and the dissemination of Tibetan 
nationalism in Khams.”11 In both analysis, Tibetans did not work for the 
Chinese government. 
Another important question is what the Tibetan masters expected from 
the Chinese government. According to Tuttle, the Panchen Lama and the 
Nor lha Qutughtu worked for their return to Tibet and the recovery of their 
former positions of authority. They adapted their behaviour to the Chinese 
government policy to attain their aims from the beginning to the end of their 
stays in China. Finally, the reader can infer that they were totally immune to 
the Chinese government ideology as they were to the social and economic 
contexts in which they lived for almost fifteen years!12  
In his last chapter, Tuttle traces how the idea to join the Chinese and 
Tibetan cultures emerged and was executed through the foundation of 
institutionalized educational and religious exchanges. These institutes had 
to first find teachers and then funding. The warlords originally participated 
in the creation of these institutions and then the Nationalist government 
became their main financial support. These institutes gained students who, 
through translations, made the link between the Chinese and Tibetan 
cultures more vivid. For Tuttle, the influence of this new peaceful policy in 
Tibet changed the Tibetan attitude toward China through 1950. These 
cultural and Buddhist exchanges between Tibet and China, with much 
creation of institutes in Sichuan close to Tibet that develop mainly during 
the 1930s, were, as Tuttle put it, a way to create a link between China and 
Tibet.  
By founding the Sino-Tibetan relationship on cultural grounds and by 
using and “accepting” sources mainly related to Buddhism (the review 
Haichao yin, archives from the Sino-Tibetan schools founded in Chongqing, 
the Dai Jitao archives, the biography and collected works of the Panchen 
Lama—and despite the Chinese published administrative sources), Tuttle 
concludes that Buddhists, Chinese and Tibetans played crucial roles in the 
foundation of the Republic of China, as the Buddhist unity became official 
government policy from 1930 and the link between Tibetans and Chinese. 
However, this conclusion makes it difficult to understand why Tuttle denies 
the link drawn by the Panchen Lama himself between Sun Yat-sen’s 
ideology and Buddhism,13 and is certain that the Panchen Lama did not 
adhere to it before 1933, when he decided to go back to Tibet and needed the 
help of the Chinese government to prepare his return.  
This story of two and half centuries of Sino-Tibetan relationships 
demonstrates the decision of the Manchu court and of the Republican 
                                                       
11  See Peng Wenbin, “Frontier Process, Provincial Politics and Movements for 
Khampa Autonomy During the Republican Period,” in L. Epstein, ed., Khams pa 
Histories, Visions of People, Place and Authority, Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of 
the IATS, 2000 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 57-84. 
12 For the political activities of Nor lha Qutughtu in Khams (Xikang), see Peng 
Wenbin, ”Frontier Process,” pp. 68-71; and for the economic reform for Tibet 
prepared by the Panchen Lama, see F. Jagou, Le 9e Panchen Lama (1883-1937), 
enjeu des relations sino-tibétaines (Paris: Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, 2004), 
pp. 156-158; 206-210. 
13 Tuttle derives this idea from the Tibetan discourse published in the Collected 
Works of the Panchen Lama, Tuttle, p. 171.  
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government to pursue friendly relations with Tibet rather than an offensive 
strategy. It shows also the great importance taken by Tibet in the Manchu 
and Chinese policies: the relation evolved from a person to person 
relationship, then the management of Tibetan affairs by the Manchu 
Imperial Household and the court for managing the outer provinces (where 
Mongolia represented the main interest), and finally the creation of the 
Mongol and Tibetan Affairs Commission that was dedicated to Mongol and 
Tibetan affairs exclusively. 
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